We propose a new, efficient nondeterministic decoding algorithm for square-free Goppa codes over for any prime . If the code in question has degree and the average distance to the closest codeword is at least , the proposed decoder can uniquely correct up to errors with high probability. The correction capability is higher if the distribution of error magnitudes is not uniform, approaching or reaching errors when any particular error value occurs much more often than others or exclusively. This makes the method interesting for (semantically secure) cryptosystems based on the decoding problem for permuted and punctured Goppa codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
P UBLIC-KEY cryptosystems based on coding theory, known for nearly as long as the very concept of asymmetric cryptography itself, have recently been attracting renewed interest because of their apparent resistance even against attacks mounted with the help of quantum computers, constituting a family of so-called post-quantum cryptosystems [1] . However, not all error-correcting codes are suitable for cryptographic applications. The most commonly used family of codes for such purposed is that of Goppa codes, which remain essentially unharmed by cryptanalysis efforts despite considerable efforts and progress in the area.
Introduced in 1970, Goppa codes [2] are a subfamily of alternant codes, i.e., subfield subcodes of generalized Reed-Solomon codes. Let for some prime and some . A Goppa code over is determined by a sequence of distinct values, and a polynomial of degree whose roots are disjoint from . Goppa binary Goppa codes where is square-free are known to have a larger minimum distance of at least instead. A family of codes where is not square-free have minimum distance at least for some , which is known as the Hartmann-Tzeng bound for Goppa codes [3] , [4] .
The class of Sugiyama-Kasahara-Hirasawa-Namekawa codes [5] , where for some square-free monic polynomial and some power of dividing , which constitute a proper superclass of the so-called wild codes where is restricted to being irreducible [6] , have minimum distance at least rather than . Although it is known that the minimum distance of a Goppa code of degree is at least and there are known cases where it is higher (up to , as it happens for binary square-free Goppa codes), systematically determining the true minimum distance of any given subfamily of Goppa codes remains largely an open problem, yet it is an important metric as it determines not only how many errors can always be uniquely corrected, but indirectly the security level and the key sizes of the cryptosystems based on each given code.
Apart from brute force, known decoding methods for alternant codes can, in general, correct only about half as many errors as a binary square-free Goppa code is in principle able to correct [7] , [8] (see also [9] ). Even the Guruswami-Sudan algorithm [10] , which exceeds the limit, can only correct about errors, or approximately when is small compared to . In contrast, Patterson's algorithm can correct all errors allowed by binary Goppa codes, as can an alternant decoder using the equivalence albeit at a larger computational cost. Bernstein's list decoding method [11] goes somewhat further, attaining a correction capability of errors (or approximately when is small) for binary irreducible Goppa codes, although decoding is ambiguous if the actual distance is not proportionally higher. Similar techniques can in principle correct about errors for wild codes [6] . Bernstein's method does not reach the -ary Johnson radius, but a more recent algorithm by Augot et al. does so in the binary case [12] .
A. Our Results
Our contribution in this paper is a nondeterministic decoding algorithm for square-free Goppa codes over for any prime . The method generalizes Patterson's approach and can potentially correct up to errors, on the condition that a suitable short vector can be found in a certain polynomial lattice. In particular, our method corrects errors in characteristic 3, exceeding the barrier when the average distance to the closest codeword is at least . In experiments conducted to assess the practical behavior of our proposal, the result of the decoding is observed to be unique with overwhelming probability for irreducible ternary Goppa codes chosen uniformly at random, hinting that, for the vast majority of such codes, the average distance to the closest codeword is sufficiently higher than the ensured minimum distance. Besides, our proposal can probabilistically correct a still larger number of errors that approaches and reaches depending on the distribution of error magnitudes. For instance, the method corrects up to errors with high probability if all error magnitudes are known to be equal.
This feature outperforms even Sugiyama-Kasahara-Hirasawa-Namekawa and wild codes and the associated decoding methods, and is particularly interesting for cryptographic applications like McEliece encryption [13] under the Fujisaki-Okamoto or similar semantic security transform [14] , where error magnitudes can be chosen by convention to be all equal. In that case, even if an attacker could somehow derive a generic alternant decoder from the public code that is typical in such systems (a strategy exploited e.g., in [15] ), he will not be able to correct more than about errors out of roughly that can be corrected with the private trapdoor enabled by our proposal, facing an infeasible workload of about guesses to mount a complete attack. This makes Goppa codes in odd characteristic, which have already been shown to sport some potential security advantages over binary ones [16] , even more attractive in practice.
For the benefit of implementors, we describe a dedicated version of the Mulders-Storjohann algorithm to convert the particular lattice basis encountered during the decoding process to weak Popov form. The computational complexity of this step is then shown to be .
B. Organization of the Paper
The remainder of this document is organized as follows. We provide basic notions in Section II. We recapitulate Patterson's decoding algorithm for binary irreducible Goppa codes in Section III and extend it to square-free codes in characteristic in Section IV, showing that it can correct errors in general and up to errors depending on the distribution of error magnitudes. We conclude this paper in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Matrix indices will start from 0 throughout this paper, unless otherwise stated. Let be a prime and let for some . The finite field of elements is written . For sequences of elements , and for some , we denote by the Toeplitz matrix with elements for and otherwise; by the Vandermonde matrix with elements , , ; and by the diagonal matrix with diagonal elements , .
A. Classical Goppa Codes
Let be a sequence (called the support) of distinct elements, and let be an irreducible monic polynomial of degree such that for all . For any word , we define the corresponding Goppa syndrome polynomial to be:
Thus, the syndrome is a linear function of . The Goppa code over with support and generator polynomial is the kernel of the syndrome function applied to elements from , i.e., the set . Writing for some , one can show that , where the parity-check matrix has the form (1) Thus, , where is a Toeplitz matrix, is a Vandermonde matrix, and is a diagonal matrix.
Since a Goppa code is a -subfield subcode, it is possible to express the syndrome function in terms of a parity-check matrix using the so-called trace construction (see, e.g., [9, Ch. 7, Sec. 7]). This is useful to obtain a syndrome equivalent to above while keeping the arithmetic operations in rather than , even though it is not immediately useful for decoding, at which point a syndrome over has to be assembled by inverting the trace construction.
The syndrome decoding problem consists of computing a small weight error pattern given its syndrome . Knowledge of the code structure in the form of the support and the polynomial makes this problem solvable in polynomial time, with some constraints relating the weight of to the degree of .
B. Polynomial Lattices
Let be a polynomial matrix, and let denote its rank (i.e., assume that has linearly independent rows). The (polynomial) lattice over spanned by the rows of is
The notion of length which we will use for is . For polynomial vectors , we adopt the notion of maximal degree length:
. This notion is coarse enough that, contrary to integer lattices where finding even an approximation to the shortest vector by a constant factor is a hard problem [17] , reducing a basis for a polynomial lattice can be achieved in polynomial time. The following result by Mulders and Storjohann holds [18] :
Theorem 1: There exists an algorithm which finds the shortest nonzero vector in the -module generated by the rows of with operations in , where . The algorithm whose existence is established by Theorem 1 is based on converting a given lattice basis to the so-called weak Popov form [18, Sec. 2] (see also [19] ), formally defined in Appendix A, which also contains a description of Algorithm 2 and its cost behavior in the context of decoding.
The weak Popov form is not the only way to find short vectors in a polynomial lattice, and in fact, this is not critical to our proposal in this paper; for instance, the method by Lee and O'Sullivan [20] , which is related to Gröbner bases, would appear to be an alternative. Our choice of the Mulders-Storjohann method, which computes the weak Popov form, derives from its conceptual simplicity and ease of implementation, since the result turns out to be a natural generalization of Patterson's decoding algorithm described in Section III.
III. PATTERSON'S DECODING METHOD
We briefly recapitulate Patterson's decoding algorithm [21] , which will provide the basis for the general algorithm we propose. The goal, of course, is to compute the error pattern given its syndrome and the structure of . Let
, and assume we are given a binary Goppa code , where the monic polynomial is irreducible. We define the Patterson locator polynomial as (2) The name locator polynomial comes from the fact that the roots of clearly indicate where errors occurred, since . Taking the derivative of the formal power series underlying , we obtain and hence, in ,
This is called the key equation, and now, we discuss how to solve it. Being a polynomial in characteristic 2, modulo can be written as for some , with and , and hence since the characteristic is 2. Therefore whence (4) where is a polynomial satisfying . Such a polynomial surely exists in characteristic 2 if is square-free: if , where each is irreducible, then can be computed as the unique square root of viewed as an element of the finite field , and can then be obtained by combining the results via the Chinese Remainder Theorem. We can thus assume that . The last equation is actually a Bézout relation , which can be solved for and with the restriction (and also but it is not used) using the extended Euclidean algorithm. Solutions can also be seen as short vectors in the lattice spanned by the rows of the following matrix:
in the sense that the degrees of these polynomials are much smaller than uniformly random vectors, since for some , by virtue of (4). Therefore, Algorithm 2 can be used to find candidate solutions . At first glance, there is no guarantee that a short vector in the lattice generated by yields the desired solution; in other words, being short is a necessary condition, but in principle not a sufficient one. However, the fact that in the binary case the minimum code distance is known [2] to be at least actually restricts to a single candidate, so that Algorithm 2 is bound to find it. Thus, decoding is always successful up to introduced errors.
IV. DECODING CODES OVER
We now show how to generalize Patterson's decoding algorithm so as to correct errors for codes defined over general prime fields. Thus, let for some prime and some , and assume we are given an irreducible Goppa code over . Let be a constant scalar. We define the generalized error locator polynomial to be (5) where the value is lifted from to (i.e., the value that occurs as an exponent is taken to mean its corresponding least nonnegative integer representative, which lies in range ). One can easily see that this definition actually coincides with Patterson error locator polynomials as defined by (2) for . Lifting (5) to the field of rational functions in characteristic 0 and taking the derivative, we have which over reduces to (6) This is the th key equation of the proposed method, which generalizes (3) to Goppa codes over .
Like the binary case, error positions are identified by the roots of the generalized locator polynomial , and hence, the number of errors that can be corrected is the number of linear factors of , which in turn is at most but can be smaller, according to the value of as one sees from (5) .
So, for instance, if for all in (5) , then the choice together with the requirement would enable only linear factors for (each contributing an increment of 2 to via (5)), and hence, only errors could be located with this method. However, the choice in the same scenario would enable linear factors in (5) , and hence, errors could be located.
Thus, a careful choice of increases the number of errors that can be corrected. One cannot expect to know a priori the optimal value of , but since there are only possibilities, the error correction strategy will be to try each of them in turn, in a simple sequential search.
The following theorem provides an upper bound for how many errors can be corrected by solving (6) when the distribution of error magnitudes is not taken carefully into account.
Theorem 2: The maximum number of errors that can be corrected by solving (6) independently of the distribution of error magnitudes is . Proof: Let denote the number of times the magnitude occurs in an error pattern of weight , so that . Since we are working with a Goppa code, the constraint for correctability is . In the extreme situation when the weight of the error pattern reaches , the most often error magnitude occurs times, attaining the lower bound when all error magnitudes occur with equal frequency. In that case, , and hence, no more errors than can be corrected independently of the distribution of magnitudes, as claimed.
Since the proposed method coincides with Patterson's for , it is not surprising that errors can be corrected in that case. However, in characteristic 3, the number of potentially correctable errors is , nondeterministically exceeding the limit of errors attainable by previously known decoding methods for codes of degree , except in the case of the so-called wild codes [6] , whereby the Goppa polynomial is a th power of an irreducible polynomial (our method, by contrast, applies when that polynomial is square-free, as we will see in Section IV-A).
Despite the low general limit of correctable errors for , it is still possible to exceed that limit in any odd characteristic if the distribution of error magnitudes is unbalanced. Indeed, all that is required to get a chance of uniquely decoding a word containing errors is that for some choice of and that the actual distance from the right codeword to any other codeword be at least . The actual number of correctable errors depends heavily on the distribution of error magnitudes and has to be computed in a case-by-case basis, always laying in the range to . In particular, if all error magnitudes are equal, in principle, one could correct errors, even though this is a statistical rather than deterministic behavior. This is especially useful for cryptographic applications involving an all-or-nothing transform [22] , as it happens e.g., for a semantically secure encryption scheme involving the McEliece one-way trapdoor function [13] and the Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion [14] . In such scenarios, the magnitudes of the introduced errors can be chosen to be all or nearly all equal by convention, making the proposed decoder attractive for its higher decodability bound, under the explicit assumption that decoding them remains hard.
A. Solving the Key Equation
We now focus on actually solving (6) . Being a polynomial in characteristic , can be written as (7) for some with , , and hence since the characteristic is . Therefore whence (8) where the are polynomials satisfying . Such polynomials surely exist in characteristic if is square-free: if where each is irreducible, then can be computed as the unique th root of viewed as an element of the finite field , and can then be obtained by uniquely combining the results via the Chinese Remainder Theorem. We can thus assume that . The Diophantine (8) has to be solved for with the stated restriction on their degrees. Solutions can be seen as short vectors in the lattice spanned by the rows of the matrix
since, by virtue of (8), one has for some . Therefore, Algorithm 2 can be used to find candidate solutions . The method is applicable whenever one can actually invert and then compute the -roots needed to define the polynomials. This is always the case when is irreducible, but not exclusively so. Indeed, to compute the , it suffices that is square-free and that is invertible modulo each of the irreducible factors of , since in this case, can be easily computed modulo those irreducible factors and finally recovered via the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
Theorem 1 ensures a cost not exceeding operations for computing short vectors in .
B. Estimating the Success Probability
Regrettably, the ability to find shorts vectors in lattice does not mean that any such vector yields a solution to (6) . We will now see that, fortunately, the proposed method has a surprisingly favorable probability of finding the right that solves (6) . As a cautionary note, we stress that a full theoretical analysis of the failure probability remains, to the best of our knowledge, an open problem. Because the distance notion here is not Euclidean, but rather that of Hamming, Minkowski's theorem on the existence of a lattice point in any large enough convex set does not appear to apply in our case. Also, the analysis would also appear to require a detailed theory on the distribution of the average distance between a vector and the closest codeword whose magnitudes satisfy some constraint (like being all equal, or following a highly skewed distribution), which to the best of our knowledge is too an open problem. As a consequence, the failure probability estimates we provide are conjectured on an empirical basis. Namely, they result from experiments conducted on a large number of random Goppa codes at which our decoding method is targeted, and for each of those codes, on a large number of decoding attempts on random error patterns following the particular magnitude constraint (equal for all error positions) for which the decoder works best.
In a successful decoding, the reduced basis for lattice leads to candidates for with degree onward, of which, of course, only the candidate with the smallest degree is the correct one. Spurious candidates of degree close to result from random-looking short (albeit not shortest) vectors in the reduced basis and are usually harmless. But the fact that those short vectors are "random-looking" means they are also a potential stumbling block for the decoder: if by chance they are such that the coefficient of the highest degree term in the associated spurious vanishes, becomes or less. Since this is connected to the vanishing of a coefficient from , this event happens with probability assuming that short spurious vectors in are approximately uniformly distributed.
In general, when trying to correct errors of equal magnitude for a uniformly random irreducible Goppa code, the top coefficients in the spurious must vanish to interfere with the decoding process, whence the probability of successful decoding is roughly . This matches the empirically observed behavior of the proposed method in odd characteristic. Not surprisingly, the method always succeeds for binary codes, since it reduces to Patterson's algorithm and the minimum code distance is known to be at least . Table I illustrates the results of experiments in Magma [23] supporting the conjecture that the probability of successful decoding is roughly . For each quadruple , a set of 10 000 Goppa codes of maximum length and degree plus an error pattern of length , weight and all magnitudes equal (to a single random value in ) were randomly generated, and the proposed method was then applied to decode the syndrome of that error pattern. The predicted number of successful decodings, pre , is then compared with the actually observed number obs of successful decodings. For each combination of and , the first listed is the largest integer satisfying . The number of introduced errors in then decreased starting from until the probability of success exceeds 0.9999. Since suc is close to 1 for large , reasonably small values are chosen for all parameters so that the probability of decoding failure is large enough to be easily discernible. This is also the reason why more detail is provided for smaller parameters. We omit the results for characteristic 2, since in all tests, we conducted no decoding failure was observed, as expected. We stress that these examples are not meant by any means for practical cryptographic use.
Decoding errors of uniformly random magnitude for a uniformly random irreducible code is of course always successful for , since in that case, does not exceed half the minimum code distance, which is at least .
C. Computing the Error Magnitudes
In contrast to generic alternant decoding methods, there is no need to compute an error evaluator polynomial to obtain the error magnitudes in the current proposal. After obtaining and finding its roots , all that is needed to compute the corresponding error values is to determine the multiplicity of each root, since one can see from (5) that . Computing is accomplished by determining how many times whenever , or alternatively by finding the highest derivative of such that (and setting ). Since the value of is not known a priori, and even in scenarios where it is actually known beforehand, an additional syndrome check is necessary for each guessed , and the process usually must check all possible values of anyway since more than one solution may exist.
D. Completed Decoder
We are finally ready to state the full decoding method explicitly in Algorithm 1. It can be seen as a list decoding algorithm with possible failures. The polynomial decomposition of (7) immediately suggests a simple and efficient way to compute the th roots needed at Step 9, namely, precompute and , and then compute the th root of as . The test in Step 2 is unnecessary if is irreducible. To find the zeroes of in Step 21, one can use the Chien search technique [24] , in which case the multiplicities of each root can be determined as part of the search, or the Berlekamp trace algorithm [25] .
Algorithm 1 Decoding -ary square-free Goppa codes
Input:
, a Goppa code over where is square-free.
Input: , a parity-check matrix in the form of (1).
Input:
, the received codeword with errors.
Output: a list of corrected codewords ( upon failure). We described a new decoding algorithm for square-free (in particular, irreducible) Goppa codes of degree over that can correct errors in general, and up to errors for certain distributions of error magnitudes of cryptographic interest. By attaining an correction capability of errors in characteristic 3 with high probability, our method outperforms the best previously known decoder for that case and suggests that the corresponding average distance to the closest codeword is at least for most irreducible ternary Goppa codes. Regardless of the characteristic, our proposal can correct a still larger number of errors that approaches (and probabilistically reaches) as the distribution of error magnitudes becomes ever more skewed toward the predominance of some individual value. The method can be viewed as generalizing Patterson's binary decoding procedure and is similarly efficient in practice.
A further increase in the number of correctable errors may be possible by resorting to list decoding and by extracting more information from the decoding process along the lines proposed by Bernstein [11] . This in principle might enable the correction of approximately errors in general, and possibly as many as errors depending on the distribution of error magnitudes. Furthermore, the ability to correct close to errors with high probability means that smaller keys might be adopted for coding-based cryptosystems. Properly chosen parameters would keep the probability of decoding failure below the probability of breaking the resulting schemes by random guessing, while maintaining the security at the desired level. We leave the investigation of such possibilities for future research.
APPENDIX WEAK POPOV FORM
For ease of reference, we provide here a concise description of the Mulders-Storjohann polynomial lattice reduction algorithm based on the weak Popov form [19] . We closely follow the exposition in [18] , while attempting to make our description more implementation-friendly.
Definition 1: For , the th pivot index vector of a matrix is defined as follows: if for all , then , otherwise 1) for , 2)
for . Definition 2: The carrier set of a matrix is the set . The th pivot element of , denoted , is the element when , otherwise . Definition 3: A matrix is said to be in weak Popov form if the positive pivot indices of are all different, i.e., if . The following theorem establishes that writing a polynomial matrix in weak Popov form yields short vectors (according to the notion of maximal degree length) in the lattice spanned by its rows.
Theorem 3 [18] : If matrix is in weak Popov form and is such that , then all vectors in the -module generated by the rows of have degree at least . Proof: See [18, Lemma 8.1]. If , and , there are unique and such that . In that case, we call the operation the simple transformation of row on row . If , the transformation is called of the first kind. Then, an efficient algorithm to put a matrix in weak Popov form stems from the following observation:
Theorem 4 [18] : is not in weak Popov form iff one can apply a simple transformation of the first kind on , that is, not all nonzero pivot indices of are different. Proof: See [18, Lemma 2.1]. Therefore, all one has to do to obtain the weak Popov form of a matrix is to repeatedly check if is already in the weak Popov form (by testing if all nonzero pivot indices are different) and, if it is not, apply a simple transformation of the first kind on it.
This process is summarized in Algorithm 2 for a matrix in the form of (9), where , the expected rank is , and the degree of all rows is bounded by . By Theorem 1, its complexity is operations at most. Here, denotes the leading coefficient of and denotes the number of occurrences of the most frequent value among the nonzero components of , i.e., , i.e., .
Algorithm 2 Computing the weak Popov form
Input: in the form of (9).
Output: weak Popov form of . 
20: return
Written in this form, Algorithm 2 is strikingly similar to the modified Euclidean algorithm usually employed in the decoding of alternant codes [8] and actually coincides with that method for .
